Evidentiary Issues and Certificates of Appealability in Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions by Hughes, Matthew
Liberty University Law Review 
Volume 14 
Issue 3 Summer 2020 Article 3 
May 2020 
Evidentiary Issues and Certificates of Appealability in Federal 
Habeas Corpus Petitions 
Matthew Hughes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review 
Recommended Citation 
Hughes, Matthew (2020) "Evidentiary Issues and Certificates of Appealability in Federal Habeas Corpus 
Petitions," Liberty University Law Review: Vol. 14 : Iss. 3 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review/vol14/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberty University School of Law at Scholars 
Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in Liberty University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholars 
Crossing. For more information, please contact scholarlycommunications@liberty.edu. 
COMMENT 
 
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND CERTIFICATES OF APPEALABILITY IN 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS 
 
Matthew Hughes† 
 
ABSTRACT 
In modern federal habeas corpus proceedings, petitioners must overcome 
numerous substantive and procedural barriers to relief. To appeal a district 
court’s final order disposing of a habeas petition, habeas petitioners must first 
obtain permission in the form of a certificate of appealability (COA), which 
must specify the issues certified for appeal. In the relatively rare event that a 
court grants a COA, the habeas petitioner might wish to appeal one or more 
evidentiary rulings. This article argues that evidentiary issues directly related 
to substantive claims certified for appeal need not be specified in the COA to 
be appealed. Like the motion for appointment of counsel in the Supreme Court 
decision Harbison v. Bell, evidentiary rulings are nonfinal orders not subject 
to the COA requirement unless they fall within the scope of the collateral order 
doctrine. The practical effect of such an interpretation is to force courts of 
appeal to do what they already have the discretion to do: thoroughly and 
carefully review every lower court evidentiary ruling related to a substantive 
claim that has been certified for appeal.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
It used to be the fashion for high-ranking government officials to arrest 
their personal and political enemies and hold them indefinitely. In some 
places, it still is. But people have got hold of two notions: that a person ought 
not to be punished or imprisoned unless the person has done something 
wrong, and that even a person who has done wrong cannot be justly punished 
or imprisoned unless society has made it clear, upfront, that the act in 
question is wrong and subject to punishment. The idea of the rule of law, an 
ancient Jewish idea that became stylish eight hundred years ago in England, 
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was combined with these two notions. Together, they were embodied in the 
Magna Carta and the writs of habeas corpus.1 
A writ of habeas corpus is a written, judicial demand—a court order—
directing the custodian (jailer) of a person in custody (prisoner) to deliver the 
body of the prisoner for a particular purpose. Historically, the purpose was 
generally to investigate whether the authorities imprisoned him2 lawfully 
and, if not, to have him released. “Habeas” or “habeas corpus” in the modern 
federal context refers to a state or federal prisoner (the petitioner) challenging 
a state or federal conviction or sentence (or both) in federal court by claiming 
the conviction or sentence (or both) violates the laws, treaties, or 
Constitution of the United States. Federal prisoners may apply for the writ 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.3 In rare 
cases, state and federal prisoners can apply for the writ under 28 U.S.C. § 
2241 and thereby escape the strictures of §§ 2254 and 2255. These and related 
provisions are generally referred to as the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 
 
†     Matthew Hughes is a second-year JD candidate at Liberty University School of Law. 
Special thanks are due to Judge Alice Batchelder of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, who 
graciously allowed me to extern in her chambers. I also owe a special debt of gratitude to Yvette 
Gerhard, who made the logistics of the externship possible and my stay very pleasant, and to 
Chris Curtin and Pierce Babirak, my supervising clerks. They assigned me the task of writing 
a general memorandum of law, allowed me to choose federal habeas corpus as the topic, and 
provided general guidance and some specific help. With the permission of Judge Batchelder, 
that memorandum became the foundation of this article and parts of it comprise much of the 
content of Part I and Sections II.A–D. Thanks are also due to Professor Stephen Rice, who 
showed me what disciplined legal thinking looks like, Judge Paul Spinden, who always enjoys 
an abstract conversation, and the other professors who have shaped my thinking. Most 
importantly, thank you to my parents, Alan and Elaine Hughes, who made me learn how to 
teach myself. 
1.   FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 37–38 (1985); see also Phillip D. Kline, Imprisoning the Innocent: The 
Knowledge of Law Fiction, 12 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 393, 435 (2018) (citations omitted); infra notes 
16–22 and accompanying text.  
2.   For convenience and because the vast majority of federal and state prisoners are males, 
this article employs masculine pronouns throughout. Inmate Gender, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
PRISONS (Jan. 25, 2020), https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_gender.jsp; 
Zhen Zeng, Jail Inmates in 2017, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Apr. 2019), https://www. 
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji17.pdf. 
3.   This article is exclusively dedicated to federal habeas law. A number of states have habeas 
corpus laws, and all have some form of postconviction relief, but they are addressed here only 
in passing. 
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This article argues that under AEDPA, if a substantive claim has been 
certified for appeal, evidentiary rulings directly related to the substantive 
claim may also be appealed even if the court did not expressly specify whether 
the evidentiary rulings were included in the certificate. This principle applies 
to all nonfinal habeas orders not covered by the collateral order doctrine. But 
this article—while drawing on cases that deal with nonfinal orders not 
dealing with evidentiary matters—argues specifically for the application of 
this principle to evidentiary rulings. 
Tens of thousands of prisoners have litigated AEDPA’s complex 
provisions, but interpreting federal habeas law is an intricate business. In 
addition to the semantic ambiguity on the fringe of nearly every statute, a 
critical component of federal habeas procedure under AEDPA remains 
obscure. Harbison v. Bell4 dealt with federal funds for habeas petitioners, but 
in order to reach that issue the Court had to decide whether a certificate of 
appealability was required for the petitioner to appeal that issue.5 The Court 
held it was not.6 The federal courts of appeal are largely unaware that the 
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)–(3)7 underlying Harbison applies to 
the relationship of evidentiary motions to substantive habeas claims on 
appeal.8 Legal scholars have failed to explore the issue, and few petitioners 
 
4.   556 U.S. 180 (2009). 
5.   Id. at 182. 
6    Id. 
7.   The provision reads as follows: 
(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, 
an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from— 
(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 
detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State 
court; or 
(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255. 
(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the 
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 
right. 
(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate 
which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph 
(2). 
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)–(3) (2012). 
8.   See infra, Section II.D.1. 
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appear to have litigated it.9 This lack of scholarly treatment is remarkable 
because habeas petitioners covet additional opportunities to plead their case 
and present a sympathetic story. Because AEDPA’s drafters designed the law 
to streamline habeas proceedings and bolster the finality of habeas decisions, 
the statute includes numerous obstacles to relief and to appeals.10 Any chink 
in AEDPA’s armor, especially a chance to present new evidence, is another 
chance at freedom. 
Part II explains the federal habeas statutory framework, including its 
provisions on evidentiary matters and appeals. It also discusses the dearth of 
legal scholarship and the disjointed federal appellate approaches to habeas 
evidentiary rulings on appeal. Part III notes the decision in Harbison v. Bell 
and the reasons underlying Harbison’s cursory ruling that where a 
substantive claim subject to AEDPA is certified for appeal under § 
2253(c)(1)–(3), related evidentiary rulings may be appealed even if the 
certificate does not expressly include them. The remainder of Part III briefly 
explores the practical benefits of this interpretation to habeas petitioners. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In twenty-first-century America, the Suspension Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution secures the writ: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it.”11 The Suspension Clause secures the writ as it 
existed in 1789.12 But the Clause does not, by itself, give courts authority to 
wield the writ. Instead, it requires Congress to authorize federal courts to 
grant the writ and allows Congress to decide the exact scope of the writ and 
the procedures for habeas petitions.13 The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted 
federal courts authority to issue writs of habeas corpus.14 Laws passed in the 
intervening centuries have modified, supplemented, and reformed federal 
 
9.   See infra, Section II.D.2. 
10.   See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 59 CORNELL L. REV. 259 (2006); 
see also infra note 101 
11.   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
12.   Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008). 
13.   Felkner v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996). 
14.   Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 82 (1789) (subsequently amended and 
superseded); Felkner, 518 U.S. at 659. 
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habeas law. The most important of these is the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).15 
A. General Principles of Habeas Corpus 
Modern federal courts recognize three forms of the writ: the writ of habeas 
corpus ad subjiciendum, the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, and the 
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. The writ of habeas corpus ad 
testificandum directs the prisoner’s jailer to bring the prisoner to court to 
testify.16 Another interesting species of the genus habeas corpus is the writ of 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the proper use of which is to obtain the 
presence of the erstwhile, imprisoned accused so that he can be tried.17 
The garden variety of the writ of habeas corpus is the writ of habeas corpus 
ad subjiciendum. By issuing it, a court demands that the body of the prisoner 
be produced, generally for an evidentiary hearing or release. The writ of 
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum also goes by the moniker of the Great Writ.18 
It is this form of the writ to which the phrase “habeas corpus” typically 
refers.19 The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is the subject of this article 
and the primary version of the writ addressed by AEDPA. 
At present, Congress has not extended the writ beyond those to whom it 
absolutely must. The Suspension Clause is the clause of the Constitution 
guaranteeing that the writ of habeas corpus may not be suspended unless the 
public safety requires it on account of war or rebellion.20 The Suspension 
Clause applies to those in United States territory.21 For example, the 
Suspension Clause applies to prisoners in Michigan and not prisoners in 
Luxembourg. Less obviously, it applies to detainees at Guantanamo Bay and 
 
15.   Pub. L. No. 104-132 (as codified in part and as amended in scattered subsections of 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253–2255, and 2261–2266 (2012)). Some portions of the law were designed 
to deter terrorism. William Diaz, Dualist, but Not Divergent: Evaluating United States 
Implementation of the 1267 Sanctions Regime, 5 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 333, 349 & n.88 (2011). 
16.   28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (2012); United States v. McGaha, 205 F. Supp. 949, 950 nn.1–2 
(E.D. Tenn. 1962) (citing Cuckovich v. United States, 170 F.2d 89, 90 (6th Cir. 1948)). 
17.   28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (2012); Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 615 (1961). 
18.   Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474 n.6 (1976) (citing Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 95 
(1807) (Marshall, C.J.)). 
19.   Id. 
20.   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
21.   See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 753 (2008). 
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may apply to others in American custody outside the United States based 
upon a three-factor test.22 
B. General AEDPA Provisions 
By petitioning for the writ under AEDPA, a petitioner asks a federal court 
to find that his conviction or sentence (or both)23 was imposed in violation 
of the Constitution or a federal law or treaty. The petition must meet several 
basic procedural requirements and must satisfy specific substantive 
standards. Petitions by prisoners under a death sentence are subject to special 
procedures and substantive requirements.24 
1. Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court, any Supreme Court justice, any district court, or any 
circuit judge may issue writs of habeas corpus “within [their] respective 
jurisdictions.”25 A person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state 
court26 must apply to the federal district court for the state in which he is held 
 
22.   Id. at 766–71; see also Lauren Easter Lynch, Note, Avoiding Judicial Second-Guessing in 
a Nontraditional Theatre of War, 12 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 105, 109–11, 122–23 (2017) (citations 
omitted); Benjamin S. White, Note, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama: Must Eliminating Dangerous 
Terrorists Entail Accepting Dangerous Political Doctrines, 8 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 411, 432–35 
(2014) (citations omitted). 
23.   The prisoner might accept his conviction but quibble with a lengthy sentence. 
24.   Sections 2261–2266 apply to death penalty cases. When entertaining an application for 
the writ of habeas corpus under §§ 2261–2266, the district court may only consider claims 
raised and decided on the merits in the state courts, unless the failure to raise the claim is the 
result of state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or the result 
of the Supreme Court’s recognition of a new federal right that is made retroactively applicable, 
or based on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered through the exercise of 
due diligence in time to present the claim for state or federal post-conviction review. 28 U.S.C. 
2264(a) (2012). Claims adjudicated on the merits in state courts are reviewed by the district 
courts pursuant to the standards in §§ 2254(a), (d), and (e). 28 U.S.C. § 2264(b) (2012). See 
Section II.B.3. The federal court presumes state-court factual findings are correct, but the 
prisoner may rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) 
(2012).  
25.   28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2012). Bankruptcy courts cannot issue the writ. In re Kerr, No. 
1530531, 2016 WL 15-78758, at *2–3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio April 15, 2016). 
26.   This includes nearly every state prisoner. But a federal prisoner simultaneously serving 
both a federal and a state sentence may challenge the state sentence via a petition for federal 
habeas relief. See Mays v. Dinwiddie, 580 F.3d 1136, 1141 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Supreme 
Court and Tenth Circuit precedents). 
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or the district in which he was convicted.27 A person in federal custody must 
apply to the federal district court in the district in which he is held.28 Once 
the application is taken up by the federal district court, the district court 
retains jurisdiction but the petition could become moot if the prisoner is 
released.29  
2. Custody 
The person seeking the writ must be “in custody.”30 “The custody 
requirement of the habeas corpus statute is designed to preserve the writ of 
habeas corpus as a remedy for severe restraints on individual liberty.”31 A 
person is in custody if he is subject to conditions that “significantly restrain 
[one’s] liberty to do those things which in this country free [persons] are 
entitled to do.”32 Prisoners are in custody. Parolees are in custody if the 
government exercises direct control over their movements.33 Because of the 
 
27.   28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (2012). If the prisoner may choose between multiple district courts, 
the district court that receives his application may, “in the exercise of its discretion and in 
furtherance of justice,” transfer it to another district court with jurisdiction. Id. 
28.   28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2012). If he applies to the Supreme Court, a Supreme Court justice, 
or a circuit judge, he must explain why. Section 2241(e), which denied federal courts 
jurisdiction to hear or consider applications filed by or on behalf of an alien who is an enemy 
combatant, was declared unconstitutional. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008). 
There are special limits on the ability of federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to illegal 
aliens. Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2018). This area of habeas corpus practice 
is influenced by current political agitation on the question of immigration and by the 
intricacies of administrative law. This area of the law is constantly in flux due to decisions 
overturning statutes, proposed legislation, amendments to existing legislation, and widespread 
and ongoing appellate litigation. 
29.   Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). The Supreme Court has been quite clear 
that a petitioner “may not collaterally attack his prior conviction” either through a writ of 
habeas corpus or through a motion under § 2255, except in cases of violation of the Sixth 
Amendment by failure to appoint counsel, but he may challenge a sentence enhanced on the 
basis of a faulty prior conviction or, in some cases, a sentence yet to be served. Steverson v. 
Summers, 258 F.3d 520, 522–24 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Supreme Court decisions). This is 
because he is not “in custody” under the prior sentence. 
30.   28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2255(a) (2012). In limited circumstances, next friend habeas 
petitions are acceptable. 
31.   Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973). 
32.   Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). 
33.   See id. For example, no court of appeals has held that sex offender registration 
requirements constitute custody. Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737, 741 (6th Cir. 2018). 
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custody requirement, a petitioner may rarely challenge a conviction or 
sentence under which he is not currently imprisoned.34 
3. Petition 
A petition for habeas corpus is a request that the court grant the writ. No 
federal judge or court is authorized to entertain an application for the writ of 
habeas corpus except “on the ground that [the petitioner] is in custody in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”35 
Therefore, a court may only grant the writ on the basis of a claim previously 
adjudicated on the merits in a state court if the adjudication resulted either 
in a “decision contrary to or involving an unreasonable application of clearly 
established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States,” or in a “decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 
 
34.   Persons detained awaiting state trial are not detained “pursuant to a judgment of a State 
court,” and may therefore apply for the writ under § 2241. A prisoner who could petition for 
relief under § 2255 may request the writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 if a motion under § 
2255 “appears . . . inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention,” even if he 
neglected to make a motion under § 2255 or he made the motion and the court denied it. 28 
U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012); Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 755 (6th Cir. 1999). This savings 
clause applies “only where the petitioner . . . demonstrates ‘actual innocence.’” Wooten v. 
Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 2012). An example would be where the Supreme Court 
narrowly construes a statutory prohibition previously interpreted broadly by the courts of 
appeal, which allows some prisoners to claim that they are innocent under the new 
interpretation. Petitions filed solely under § 2241 “are not subject to the heightened standards 
contained in § 2254(d), [so the court] must conduct a de novo review of the state court 
proceedings.” Phillips v. Court of Common Pleas, 668 F.3d 804, 810 (6th Cir. 2012). 
35.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012). 
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in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.”36 Courts 
frequently refer to this standard as “AEDPA deference.”37 
A federal prisoner who claims a right to be released because his sentence 
is subject to collateral attack may move the court which imposed the sentence 
to vacate, set aside, or correct it.38 The court must grant relief if the sentencing 
court lacked jurisdiction, “the sentence imposed was not authorized by law 
or is otherwise open to collateral attack,” or the judgment is rendered 
vulnerable to collateral attack by virtue of “a denial or infringement of the 
[prisoner’s] constitutional rights.”39 Appropriate relief under the statute 
consists of vacating, setting aside, or correcting the sentence.40 Relief is only 
 
36.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012). Ineffective assistance of counsel during federal or state 
collateral post-conviction proceedings (such as for habeas relief) is not sufficient grounds for 
relief in a proceeding arising under § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2012). “Law is clearly 
established when Supreme Court precedent unambiguously provides a controlling legal 
standard.” Blackston v. Rapelje, 780 F.3d 340, 348 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Regarding the phrase “unreasonable application”: “AEDPA does 
not ‘require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern before a 
legal rule must be applied’ . . . . [E]ven a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable 
manner.” Id. (citation omitted). A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it 
“arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law” 
or “arrives a result opposite” that of a Supreme Court case dealing with facts which are 
“materially indistinguishable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
The Supreme Court has held that the second prong “imposes a highly deferential 
standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court decisions be given 
the benefit of the doubt.” Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011) (citation and internal 
quotations omitted). Federal courts presume that state-court factual findings are correct, but 
the petitioner may rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(e)(1). Even where a state court violated the prisoner’s constitutional rights, he is not 
entitled to habeas relief if the error was harmless (i.e., not prejudicial). 
37.   E.g., Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir 2006); see also Joseph S. Hamrick, 
Florida’s Drug Statute, Mens Rea, and Due Process, 7 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 175, 178 (2013) (noting 
the importance of AEDPA deference to comparing federal and state precedent interpreting 
the Constitution) (citations omitted). If the state court did not rule on the claim’s merits, as 
happens in rare circumstances, the federal court reviews the claim de novo. Cone v. Bell, 556 
U.S. 449, 472 (2009). 
38.   28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012). Several specific grounds for collateral attack are listed in 
the statute: the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, and the sentence was in 
excess of the maximum authorized by law. 
39.   28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2012). 
40.   28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012). 
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available when “the claimed error of law was a fundamental defect which 
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice . . . [and] presents 
exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy . . . is apparent.”41 
4. Exhaustion of State Remedies 
State prisoners generally must exhaust potential remedies in state court 
before bringing the claim in federal court. The court must deny the writ 
unless (1) the applicant has exhausted his state court remedies, (2) no state 
corrective process is available to the petitioner, or (3) the corrective process 
would be “ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.”42 Because the last 
two situations are quite rare, the exhaustion requirement is almost 
universal.43 If the petitioner did not exhaust all his state remedies, the court 
may nevertheless deny the application on the merits.44 In practical terms, the 
exhaustion requirement almost always bars a state prisoner from raising a 
ground for federal habeas relief that he did not raise in the state court 
 
41.   Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
42.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). 
43.   Inordinate delay by a state court is one of the rare categories of circumstances the 
federal courts have found to be an exception to the exhaustion requirement. See Phillips v. 
White, 851 F.3d 567, 574–76 (6th Cir. 2017). The state can only waive or be estopped from 
asserting the exhaustion requirement by the state’s attorneys expressly waiving it. 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(b)(3) (2012). 
44.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (2012). 
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system.45 The applicant has not exhausted all available state remedies if he 
raises a question that he has the right to raise under the law of the state.46 
5. Second or Successive Petitions 
A person in custody may file a second or successive application for the writ 
of habeas corpus in federal court in only exceptional circumstances.47 The 
applicant cannot file a second or successive petition under § 2254 (governing 
petitioners under a state court judgment) without first obtaining an order 
from the appropriate court of appeals authorizing the district court to 
consider the application.48 A circuit judge or district judge may dismiss a 
 
45.   Generally, federal courts cannot consider claims that are procedurally defaulted. 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977). Judgments based on state law grounds, whether 
substantive or procedural, preclude habeas relief where the state law grounds are “independent 
of” federal law and are “adequate to support the judgment,” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 
722, 729 (1991) (abrogated on other grounds by Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012)), unless 
the prisoner shows “cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.” 
Martinez, 566 U.S. at 10. In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that procedural default of an 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IATC) claim on account of failure to raise it in state 
collateral (post-conviction) proceedings could be excused if the petitioner did not have 
effective assistance of counsel during the collateral proceedings. Id. The Martinez-Trevino 
exception applies to IATC claims where the state either “denies permission to raise the claim 
on direct appeal” or “grants permission but . . . denies meaningful opportunity” for direct 
review of the claim. Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 429 (2013). 
46.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (2012). This rule has also been expressed in the following terms: 
“The exhaustion requirement is satisfied when the highest court in the state in which the 
petitioner was convicted has been given a full and fair opportunity to rule on the petitioner’s 
claims.” Murphy v. Ohio, 551 F.3d 485, 501 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). Federal courts “will not review claims that were not entertained by the state 
court due to . . . the petitioner's failure to raise those claims in the state courts while state 
remedies were available.” Irick v. Bell, 565 F.3d 315, 323–24 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration in original). 
47.   A state prisoner can raise a claim in a second or successive application for the writ of 
habeas corpus under § 2254 if he shows that his claim relies on a new and previously 
unavailable rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on 
collateral review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2012). He can also raise a claim in a successive 
petition if he proves that he could not have discovered the factual predicate for the claim 
previously through the exercise of due diligence and that the facts underlying the claim would 
be sufficient to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that no reasonable factfinder 
would have found the applicant guilty apart from constitutional error. 28 U.S.C. § 
2244(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
48.   28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2012). The court must determine the motion 30 days after 
it is filed and can only grant it if the application makes a prima facie showing that it satisfies 
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second or successive application for relief by a federal prisoner under § 2255 
(governing petitioners under a federal court judgment) if the legality of the 
detention has already been determined on a prior application.49 A second or 
successive motion under either § 2254 or § 2255 can only be heard if the 
appropriate court of appeals certifies that the motion meets the substantive 
requirements for second or successive habeas petitions under § 2244.50 
C. AEDPA Procedures 
A petition institutes a new civil proceeding that is neither a stage in a 
criminal proceeding nor an appeal from a criminal proceeding.51 A court’s 
issuing the writ is a legal remedy.52 Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the writ of habeas corpus is not available to overturn a federal civil 
judgment.53 Unlike a direct appeal and unlike a writ for error coram nobis, by 
which a higher court directs a lower court to take notice of facts previously 
ignored, the proceeding instigated by an application for the writ of habeas 
corpus is separate from the proceeding being challenged.54 The Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure generally apply to habeas proceedings, but there are 
special legislatively enacted rules of habeas procedure. The habeas 
evidentiary rules are discussed below. 
 
the substantive requirements. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(B)–(C) (2012). If a petitioner has 
already filed a petition, his subsequent petition is not “second or successive” if the prior 
application was not disposed of on the merits. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000) 
(holding that dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies is not dismissal on the merits and 
therefore does not render a subsequent petition “second or successive”).  
49.   28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (2012). 
50.   28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2012). 
51.   Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 269 (1978) (superseded on other grounds 
by Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts 
(2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules-governing-section-2254-and-
section-2255-proceedings.pdf, as recognized in Ukawabutu v. Morton, 997 F. Supp. 605 
(D.N.J. 1998)). 
52.   Adderly v. Wainwright, 58 F.R.D. 389, 402 (M.D. Fla. 1972). 
53.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
54.   Several federal circuit courts have expressly held that if a federal prisoner mislabels his 
petition as one for the writ of error coram nobis, it can be properly treated as a motion for 
relief under § 2255. Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 528 n.1 (4th Cir. 1970) (superseded 
on other grounds by 28 U.S.C. § 2255, as recognized in Gonzalez v. United States, No 3:17-cv-
1011(VLB), 2018 WL 5314914 (D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2018)) (citing cases from the Third and 
Seventh Circuits). 
342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd   58 5/14/20   9:43 AM
2020]                                  EVIDENTIARY ISSUES                              499 
   
 
1. Applicability of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern habeas proceedings only to the 
extent that habeas proceedings have generally adhered to civil litigation 
practices and to the extent that federal law, the Rules Governing Section 2254 
Cases, and the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings do not provide 
otherwise.55 A district court explained the decisions on the applicability of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the context of class actions: 
Habeas class actions are an appropriate procedural 
vehicle in certain limited situations. Although habeas 
actions are not strictly governed by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and therefore the class action provisions of the 
rules do not automatically apply to habeas actions, a court 
retains the power to fashion for habeas actions appropriate 
means of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or 
otherwise in conformity with judicial usage.56 
The procedures governing the writs of habeas corpus are specified in part 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules Governing Section 2254 
Cases, the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, and several provisions 
of §§ 2241–2255 and 2261–2266. The federal civil rules govern motions to 
vacate, set aside, or correct under § 2255, but the procedures governing writs 
of habeas corpus govern applications for the writ under the savings clause57 
in § 2255. 
2. General procedures 
A person applying for the writ must apply in a “writing signed and verified 
by the person” seeking relief or “by someone acting on his behalf.”58 The 
writing must allege the facts concerning the petitioner’s custody, the name of 
 
55.   FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(4); Browder, 434 U.S. at 269 (superseded on other grounds by Rules 
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts 
(2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules-governing-section-2254-and-
section-2255-proceedings.pdf, as recognized in Ukawabutu v. Morton, 997 F. Supp. 605 
(D.N.J. 1998)). 
56.   Wang v. Reno, 862 F. Supp. 801, 811 (E.D.N.Y 1994) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1975). 
57.   See supra note 34 and discussion therein. 
58.   28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2012). 
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his custodian, and, if known, the grounds on which he is held.59 The 
petitioner may amend or supplement the petition under Rule 15 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.60 A statute of limitations of one year applies 
to state and federal prisoners applying for federal habeas relief.61 The period 
is tolled while a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other 
collateral review is pending and can also be tolled for equitable reasons.62 
Unless it is evident from the application itself that the petitioner is not 
entitled to relief, the judge must immediately grant the writ or order the 
respondent to show why it should not be granted.63 The judge must issue the 
writ or order to the custodian, who has three days to file a return showing 
why the petitioner is detained.64 The court may grant leave to amend the 
return before or after it is filed.65 The respondent, variously described as the 
jailer or the custodian, must also promptly file certified copies of the 
indictment, plea of the petitioner, and the judgment, to the extent that the 
copies are relevant and the petitioner did not include them in his petition.66 
 
59.   Id. 
60.   See id. 
61.   28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1); 2255(f)(1)–(4) (2012). The period and its triggers are identical 
for federal and state prisoners. The period begins on the date of the last of four possible events. 
First, the period may begin on the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 
of direct review or when the time for seeking direct review expired. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(A); 
2255(f)(1). Second, if the prisoner was prevented from applying by state actions in violation 
of the Constitution or laws of the United States, then the period begins on the date the 
impediment caused by those actions is removed. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(B); 2255(f)(2). Third, 
if the right that forms the basis for the challenge has been newly recognized by the Supreme 
Court and made retroactively applicable to all cases on collateral review, the period begins on 
the date the right was initially recognized by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(C); 
2255(f)(3). Fourth, the period may begin on the date on which the factual predicate for the 
claim could have been discovered by exercising due diligence. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(D); 
2255(f)(4). 
62.   28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (2012). In one case, the period was tolled for nine and a half 
years on this basis. Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 549 (2011); see also Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
631, 649 (2010). The Sixth Circuit refused to toll the period of limitations for one applicant, 
who missed the deadline by five days, despite a litany of delays and hindrances. Hall v. Warden, 
Lebanon Corr. Inst., 662 F.3d 745 (6th Cir. 2011); cf. Sherwood v. Prelesnik, 579 F.3d 581 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (granting equitable tolling where petitioner conducted his post-conviction 
proceedings in state court in reliance on precedent that was later overturned).  
63.   28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012). 
64.   Id. 
65.   Id. 
66.   28 U.S.C. § 2249 (2012). 
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The judge may stay any state proceeding against the petitioner that concerns 
any matter involved in the habeas proceeding.67 The federal court may even 
stay the execution of a death sentence if the petitioner applies for 
appointment of counsel in federal court under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2).68 Any 
stayed proceeding is void if carried on despite the stay.69 
3. Evidentiary Motions 
AEDPA and the legislatively enacted rules of habeas procedure 
contemplate three means of obtaining and presenting evidence: evidentiary 
hearings, discovery, and expanding the record. AEPDA contains provisions 
on evidentiary hearings, but motions for discovery and to expand the record 
are governed by legislatively enacted rules. The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure apply only if the district court authorizes discovery. 
Under AEDPA, “evidentiary hearings are not mandatory.”70 Federal 
prisoners applying for the writ under § 2255 face a low bar. The court must 
grant a hearing “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case 
conclusively show” that the petition should be denied.71 But for petitions filed 
under § 2254 by state prisoners, the court should grant an evidentiary hearing 
only if “such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s 
factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas 
relief.”72 In exercising its discretion on the question of an evidentiary 
hearing,73 the district court must consider the statutory standards for 
granting a hearing.74 The district courts rarely grant evidentiary motions.75  
 
67.   28 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
68.   28 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(3). 
69.   28 U.S.C. § 2251(b). 
70.   Johnson v. Mitchell, 585 F.3d 923, 934 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Vroman v. Brigano, 
346 F.3d 598, 606 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
71.   28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2012). 
72.   Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). 
73.   Ryan v. Gonzalez, 568 U.S. 57, 74 (2013). 
74.   Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 183 (2011). A district court’s decision to grant or 
refuse an evidentiary hearing under § 2255(b)—which the district court “must” grant if the 
statutory standard is met—is reviewed for abuse of discretion. E.g., Winthrop-Redin v. United 
States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 
2008). 
75.   But see United States v. Shields, Nos. 12-cr-00410-BLF-1 & 17-cv-03978-BLF, 2020 WL 
353550, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2020) (denying the habeas petitioner’s motion for an 
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Federal courts reviewing claims decided on the merits in state courts can 
consider only “the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the 
claim on the merits.”76 Under § 2254(e), the court will hold an evidentiary 
hearing for a petitioner who neglected to properly develop the factual basis 
of the claim in state court if the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient 
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional 
error, “no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the 
underlying offense.”77 The petitioner will generally not receive a hearing 
unless he also demonstrates that his claim relies on a new rule of 
constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 
Supreme Court and that was previously unavailable, or on a factual predicate 
that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due 
diligence.78 
If the court grants a hearing, the petitioner still faces an uphill battle. 
Factual determinations made in the original state court proceedings are 
presumed correct, but that presumption may be rebutted by clear and 
convincing evidence.79 The petitioner must produce the part of the record 
proving his claim, or if he is unable, the federal court must order a state 
official to produce the pertinent part of the record.80 If neither the petitioner 
nor the state can produce it, the federal court must decide under the existing 
circumstances what weight to accord to the state court’s factual 
determinations.81  
The court may grant discovery or direct the parties to expand the record. 
The court may grant discovery for “good cause.”82 The petitioner may request 
 
evidentiary hearing but granting his motion to supplement the record); Lockett v. Clark, No. 
3:18CV325, 2020 WL 201049, at *8 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2020). 
76.   Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181. 
77.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B) (2012); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432–33 (2000). 
78.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A). 
79.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Sections 2245–2250 and the Rules Governing Section 2254 
Cases contain additional evidentiary rules.  
80.   “A copy of the official records of the [s]tate court, duly certified by the clerk of such 
court as a true and correct copy of the finding, judicial opinion, or other reliable written indicia 
showing such a factual determination by the State court shall be admissible in the Federal court 
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(g). 
81.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(f). 
82.   Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts R. 6(a) (2012
) http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules-governing-section-2254-and-section-
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discovery, including interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for 
production of documents.83 Discovery by state prisoners must be conducted 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,84 but the court may allow federal 
prisoners to conduct discovery “in accordance with the practices and 
principles of law.”85 This allows flexibility for the court to authorize discovery 
according to the traditional practices relating to motions to vacate, set aside, 
or correct a sentence. The court may also “direct the parties to expand the 
record.”86 Letters written before the motion was filed, exhibits, answers to 
interrogatories, and affidavits may be included in the record if the judge so 
orders.87 The petitioner may move the court to direct that the record be 
expanded.88 
D. AEDPA’s Certificate of Appealability Requirement 
In habeas proceedings, the petitioner may appeal the district court’s 
decision.89 In order to appeal, the petitioner must first obtain a certificate of 
appealability (COA) from the district court or the court of appeals, but the 
government can appeal without one.90 The Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, as well as the local rules and internal operating procedures of the 
courts of appeal, govern the mechanics of the petition, appeal, and COA.91 
 
 
 
2255-proceedings.pdf (hereinafter “28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 6”); Rules Governing Section 2255 
Cases in the United States District Courts R. 6(a) (2012) 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/rules-governing-section-2254-and-
section-2255-proceedings.pdf (hereinafter “28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 6”). 
83.   28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 6(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 6(b). 
84.   28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 6(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 6(a). 
85.   28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 6(a). 
86.   28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 7(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 7(a). It is important to distinguish between 
evidentiary rulings at the district court and, for instance, motions to expand the record on 
appeal. See McIntire v. Gray, No. 19-3770, 2019 WL 7882541, at *1, *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2019). 
87.   28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 7(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 7(b). 
88.   The motion may be made either to the district court before relief is granted or denied 
or to the appellate court during an appeal. See United States v. Shields, Nos. 12-cr-00410-BLF-
1 & 17-cv-03978-BLF, 2020 WL 353550, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2020); McIntire, at *1,*5.  
89.   28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (2012). 
90.   28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)–(3). 
91.   FED. R. APP. P. 22. 
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1. AEDPA Appeals in General 
The standards of review for habeas petitions on appeal are the same as 
those applied in typical cases—conclusions of law de novo, and findings of 
fact for clear error: “We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions 
in granting or denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus; we review its 
factual findings for clear error.”92 Because of this standard, prisoners bringing 
habeas petitions under § 2254 in a federal court of appeal must overcome the 
two hurdles of deference. The first hurdle is deference to state courts. Federal 
courts defer to the not unreasonable factual and legal findings of state courts, 
meaning that § 2254 determinations can only be overturned if the legal 
findings are contrary to or are an unreasonable application of clearly 
established federal law, or if the factual findings are unreasonable.93 The 
second hurdle is deference to the district courts. While the court reviews legal 
conclusions de novo, all factual findings are reviewed for clear error. 
“If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.”94 
Combined, these two hurdles seriously impede petitions for the writ of 
habeas corpus relying on grounds decided on the merits in state court. Claims 
not considered on the merits by state courts are subject to de novo review,95 
but in such cases, the federal district court’s findings of fact are reviewed only 
for clear error. The upshot is that many habeas claims are reviewed, at least 
in part, under two levels of highly deferential review.96 
2. Motions Treated Identically to Habeas Petitions 
Motions that are not habeas petitions under either § 2254 or § 2255 may 
be subject to the requirements of AEDPA. In particular, motions under Rule 
60(b) that are substantially similar to habeas petitions are subject to the COA 
 
92.   Irick v. Bell, 565 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 2009). 
93.   Federal courts reviewing claims decided on the merits in state courts can consider only 
“the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). 
94.   Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). 
95.   Gumm v. Mitchell, 775 F.3d 345, 360 (6th Cir. 2014); Murphy v. Ohio, 551 F.3d 485, 
494 (6th Cir. 2009).  
96.   In Morris v. Carpenter, 802 F.3d 825 (6th Cir. 2015), the Sixth Circuit carefully laid out 
the facts and thoughtfully analyzed several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and the 
special considerations due such cases. 
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requirement.97 Rule 59(e) motions based on the merits of a prior habeas claim 
should be construed as second or successive habeas petitions.98 Other 
motions that are essentially requests for habeas relief or that could be used to 
circumvent AEDPA’s requirement to achieve the equivalent of habeas relief 
can be subject to AEDPA provisions, including the certificate of appealability 
requirement.99 
3. Certificate of Appealability 
To appeal a federal district court’s denial of a claim for habeas relief, the 
petitioner must first obtain a COA.100 The requirement is designed to 
preserve judicial resources and prevent endless habeas litigation.101 The 
relevant statute states, “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 
appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals” either from 
“the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding” under § 2254 or from “the 
final order in a proceeding under [§] 2255.”102 This does not include the very 
rare habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.103 
 
97.   Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531–32 (2005); see also Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 
1213, 1215–16 (10th Cir. 2006). For a discussion of motions under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(6) in habeas cases, see Andrew P. Lopiano, Comment, Dumplings Instead of 
Flowers: An Argument for a Case-by-Case Approach to FRCP 60(b)(6) Motions Predicated on a 
Change in Habeas Corpus Law, 15 LIBERTY U.L. REV. (2020). 
98.   See Rishor v. Ferguson, 822 F.3d 482, 492 (9th Cir. 2016); Cory Wilson, Note, Rishor 
v. Ferguson: The Ninth Circuit Erred in Holding that Rule 59(e) Motions are not Subject to the 
Restrictions of AEDPA When Those Motions Do not Present Entirely New Claims for Habeas 
Corpus Relief, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 641, 642 (2018). 
99.   Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531–32. 
100.   Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000). 
101.   Congress had good reason to create powerful barriers to endless and fruitless habeas 
litigation. One case from the Ninth Circuit is illustrative: 
Thirty-eight years ago, on May 26, 1980, Payton raped Pamela 
Montgomery and stabbed her to death with a butcher knife. During the 
frenzied attack, he also attempted to kill Patricia Pensinger and her young 
son. Both survived and identified Payton as the attacker. . . . Nearly forty 
years later, the parties are still litigating Payton’s conviction and sentence. 
Payton v. Davis, 906 F.3d 812, 813–14 (9th Cir. 2018) (footnote omitted). 
102.   28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2012). 
103.   E.g., Phillips v. Court of Common Pleas, 668 F.3d 804, 810 (6th Cir. 2012). Persons 
detained awaiting trial in a state court are not detained “pursuant to a judgment of a State 
court,” and may therefore apply for the writ under § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(a) (2012). A 
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The statute then specifies that a COA “may issue . . . only if the applicant 
has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,”104 and 
that the COA “shall indicate which specific issue or issues” on which a 
satisfactory showing has been made.105 “Despite the language of [the 
statute], . . . Rule 22(b) [of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure] permits 
a district judge to issue a COA.”106 If the district court denies a COA, the 
petitioner may petition the court of appeals for one.107 The court of appeals 
lacks jurisdiction to consider the substantive claims unless either it or the 
district court first issue a COA.108 The government is not required to obtain 
a COA to appeal a district court’s grant of habeas relief, and if the government 
appeals, the petitioner may defend the favorable judgment with alternative 
arguments and arguments rejected below without obtaining a COA.109 
District courts routinely deny COAs on all claims and courts of appeal rarely 
grant or expand COAs.110 
E. Certificates of Appealability and Evidentiary Motions 
The language of § 2253(c) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Harbison 
v. Bell demonstrate that a COA is required only for the substantive claims 
 
person authorized by § 2255 to apply for relief may apply for a writ of habeas corpus under § 
2241 if a motion under § 2255 “appears inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his 
detention,” even if he neglected to make a motion under § 2255 or he made the motion and 
the court denied it. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012); Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 755 (6th 
Cir. 1999). This savings clause applies “only where the petitioner . . . demonstrates ‘actual 
innocence.’” Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). An example would be where the Supreme Court narrowly 
construes a statutory prohibition previously interpreted broadly by the courts of appeal, which 
allows some prisoners to claim that they are innocent under the new interpretation. 
104.   28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). 
105.   28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3) (2012). 
106.   Ryan Hagglund, Comment, Review and Vacatur of Certificate of Appealability Issued 
After the Denial of Habeas Corpus Petitions, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 989, 997 (2005). See FED. R. APP. 
P. 22(b). 
107.   28 U.S.C.§ 2254 R. 11(a) (2012), 28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 11(a) (2012). 
108.   Buck v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 759, 774 (2017). 
109.   Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 271, 282–83 (2015). 
110.   Compare Gonser v. Braman, No. 19-1770, 2020 WL 207138, at *1–2 (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 
2020), with Von Tobel v. Benedetti, No. 18-15892, 2020 WL 110514, at *1, *3, (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 
2020), and O’Neill v. Baker, No. 3:11-cv-00901-MMD-CLB, 2020 WL 60235, at *1 (D. Nev. 
Jan. 6, 2020). 
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denied in the district court’s final order,111 but neither legal scholars nor the 
federal courts of appeal have recognized this. Harbison held that a COA 
“pursuant to [§ 2253(c)] is not required to appeal an order denying a request 
for counsel under [18 U.S.C.] § 3599 because § 2253(c)(1)(A) governs only 
final orders that dispose of a habeas corpus proceeding’s merits.”112 
Underlying Harbison’s cursory treatment of the COA question are several 
significant arguments bolstering the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
statute. Therefore, although few circuits have recognized it,113 a COA is not 
required to appeal evidentiary rulings related to a claim for which a COA has 
been granted.114 Legal scholars have not addressed the applicability of 
AEDPA’s COA requirement to evidentiary motions directly related to 
substantive claims certified for appeal, but the courts of appeal have. Some of 
the courts of appeal have correctly applied Harbison to COAs for evidentiary 
rulings, while others have not. Several have issued rulings that contradict 
their own precedents. Most have cited Harbison for other propositions, but 
none seem to be entirely clear on the implications for evidentiary rulings of 
Harbison and its interpretation of § 2253(c). 
1. Courts of Appeal 
The federal courts of appeal have adopted—and, after Harbison, 
retained—interpretations of the COA requirement inconsistent with 
Harbison or have not yet fully implemented its holding.115 For instance, the 
Ninth Circuit is well aware of the Harbison decision: the Court of Appeals for 
 
111.   See Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009). 
112.   Harbison, 556 U.S. at 181 (emphasis added). 
113.   See infra Section II.E.1. 
114.   28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 6(a), R. 7(a) (2004); R. 8(a) (2009), 28 U.S.C. § 2255 R. 6(a), R. 
7(a) (2004); R. 8(a) (2009). These rules provide for three main methods to produce evidence 
in habeas proceedings: discovery, evidentiary hearings, and expansions of the record. 
115.   An important clarification on sources is appropriate here. The author has made the 
most thorough exploration of the question that is possible given the current state of legal 
research. However, it is inevitable that some decisions have been overlooked, if for no other 
reason than that—as the sources cited in this section demonstrate—so many opinions address 
this question neither directly nor expressly. The author was forced to resort to indirect 
methods of searching for circuit and district court opinions, as well as many a magistrate 
judge’s Report and Recommendation. Hence, after reviewing thousands of cases and 
continually reviewing the most recent habeas decisions at all levels of the federal judiciary, this 
summary seems to be the most accurate and representative summary of the current approach 
of federal courts to evidentiary issues in habeas appeals. It is certainly the most comprehensive 
summary to date of which the author is aware. 
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the Ninth Circuit and its district courts have cited Harbison in more than 
sixty decisions.116 The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that the Harbison 
holding must mean that a modification of a protective order does not require 
a COA because the modification order is not a final order.117 Notably, the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure do not expressly address the 
question.118  
The First Circuit has yet to cite Harbison, and neither the Second nor the 
Third Circuit applied its holding to evidentiary rulings. The First Circuit has 
held that a COA as to whether a habeas petition was barred as untimely 
necessarily included the issue of whether “discovery of [an] alleged 
error . . . is a ‘factual predicate’ for the purposes of the AEDPA statute of 
limitations” because the disputed issue of law had to be resolved before the 
court could resolve the claim being appealed.119 The Second Circuit 
considered an evidentiary ruling on appeal even though only the substantive 
claim was certified.120  
A Third Circuit decision from 2015 noted that the court had expressly 
included “the issues of whether the District Court erred in denying an 
evidentiary hearing and [the petitioner’s] request for discovery.”121 The same 
court recently granted a COA on a substantive issue and remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing, but the issue certified for appeal was the legal question 
of “whether the District Court erred in determining that [the petitioner] was 
not in custody when he filed his habeas petition.”122 The District of New 
 
116.   These decisions frequently cite Harbison for its holding respecting appointment of 
counsel. E.g., Samayoa v. Davis, 928 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2019). 
117.   Lambright v. Ryan, 698 F.3d 808, 817 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Ghent v. Wong, 371 
F. App’x 782, 784 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010); but see United States v. Winkles, 795 F.3d 1134, 1141–
42 (9th Cir. 2015). 
118.   See FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). 
119.   Holmes v. Spencer, 685 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Owens v. United States, 
483 F.3d 48, 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2007) (reversing and remanding for an evidentiary hearing without 
discussing whether the evidentiary issue was certified for appeal). 
120.   Riley v. Noeth, No. 18-770, 2020 WL 556380, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2020). 
121.   United States v. Manamela, 612 F. App’x 151, 154 (3rd Cir. 2015) (citing the joint 
appendix of the case and indicating that this COA was granted after August 12, 2013). 
122.   Johnson v. Warden McDowell FCI, No. 18-1241, 2019 WL 6321087, at *1 (3d Cir. 
Nov. 26, 2019) (lacking any indication that the evidentiary ruling was specified in the COA); 
see also United States v. Jackson, No. 17-2647, 2020 WL 550731, at *1 & n.1 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 
2020); Wharton v. Vaughn, 722 F. App’x 268, 270 (3d Cir. 2018) (granting a COA and 
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Jersey denied all seven grounds of the petitioner’s habeas petition, including 
a ground seeking an evidentiary hearing, and then denied a COA as to the 
entire petition.123  
The Fourth Circuit has applied Harbison’s holding on COAs in a variety 
of contexts. According to the Fourth Circuit, a district court’s decision on a 
motion to proceed in forma pauperis need not be certified for appeal.124 
Neither does a district court order dismissing a petition or motion as an 
unauthorized second or successive petition.125 The Fourth Circuit has 
recognized that the following are also nonfinal orders that do not require a 
COA to be appealed: (1) orders construing Rule 60(b) motions as second or 
successive habeas petitions and denying them as barred by the statute of 
limitations; (2) orders denying motions to alter or amend a habeas order; (3) 
orders denying motions for transcripts at the government’s expense; (4) 
orders denying motions for appointment of counsel; (5) orders denying 
petitions as untimely; (6) orders denying petitions for failure to exhaust state 
remedies; (7) orders denying motions for recusal; (8) orders denying motions 
to reconsider a habeas petition; and (9) orders denying motions for 
mootness.126 The Fourth Circuit reviewed the logic of Harbison in some 
depth in 2015, showing that the Fourth Circuit clearly understands its 
 
remanding for an evidentiary hearing), aff’g in part and vacating in part and remanding for an 
evidentiary hearing No. 01-6049, 2012 WL 3535868 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2012). In Wharton, the 
Third Circuit granted a COA and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, but the decision of 
whether to grant or deny a COA is separate from the decision on the legal issue for which a 
COA might be granted or denied. 
123.   Chippero v. Attorney Gen. of New Jersey, No. 3:15-cv-6272, 2020 WL 205947, at *26–
27 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2020) (unpublished). 
124.   E.g., Jackson v. Lewis, 771 F. App’x 316, 316 (4th Cir. 2019). 
125.   E.g., United States v. Barnes, 752 F. App’x 161, 161 (4th Cir. 2019). 
126.   E.g., Morley v. Clarke, 773 F. App’x 769, 769–70 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. 
Courtney, 773 F. App’x 704, 704–05 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Ruffin, 740 F. App’x 363, 
363 (4th Cir. 2018); Cleveland v. Adger, 740 F. App’x 356, 357 (4th Cir. 2018); Garvin v. 
William, 740 F. App’x 348, 348 (4th Cir. 2018); Miller v. Nohe, 740 F. App’x 378, 378 (4th Cir. 
2018); United States v. Day, 746 F. App’x 212, 213 (4th Cir. 2018). All of these decisions are 
designated as unpublished and reported in the Federal Appendix, but nonetheless show the 
Fourth Circuit’s approach to COAs. According to the Fourth Circuit, dismissal of a petition 
for failure to prosecute, failure to comply with a court order, or failure to pay a filing fee are 
also nonfinal orders not subject to the COA requirement.  
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implications.127 However, it appears to have never directly applied Harbison 
to the applicability of the COA requirement to evidentiary rulings. At least 
one Fourth Circuit district court—exercising laudable attention to detail but 
neglecting to properly interpret § 2253(c)(1)–(3)—expressly granted a COA 
on an evidentiary issue.128 
The Fifth Circuit has held that no COA is required to appeal the denial of 
an evidentiary ruling as long as the evidentiary ruling is directly related to a 
certified substantive claim.129 However, in one case it inexplicably reviewed 
the denial of an evidentiary hearing in the process of denying a COA on the 
related substantive claim.130 It was not until 2017 that a three-judge panel of 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Harbison decision to district 
court evidentiary rulings.131 But the very next year, another three-judge 
panel—including one of the same judges—expressly discussed denying a 
COA on an evidentiary ruling.132 Other Fifth Circuit decisions held that other 
nonfinal orders do not require COAs because they do not dispose of the 
litigation on the merits and leave nothing but execution of the judgment.133 
Nevertheless, in December 2019, the Northern District of Texas adopted a 
magistrate judge’s recommendation, denied requests for an evidentiary 
hearing and appointment of counsel, and then denied a COA without 
indicating whether that COA would have included the requests for a hearing 
and for appointment of counsel.134 That same month, a federal magistrate 
 
127.   See United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Farmer v. Booker, 
791 F. App’x 415, 415 (4th Cir. 2020) (denying a COA as unnecessary because the habeas 
petitioner did not challenge the basis of the district court’s decision and therefore forfeited all 
his potentially effective arguments). 
128.   Buhs v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-14117-CIV-ROSENBURG/MAYNARD, 2018 
WL 10323507, at *4 (Mar. 14, 2018). 
129.   Norman v. Stephens, 817 F.3d 226, 234 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding so without explaining 
the basis for its decision). 
130.   Segundo v. Davis, 831 F.3d 345, 351–52 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that petitioner was 
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and did not 
make a sufficient showing to warrant a COA on that claim). 
131.   See Washington v. Davis, 715 F. App’x 380, 383 (5th Cir. 2017); see also LaFlamme v. 
Davis, No. 19-40484, 2020 WL 897124, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 24, 2020) (per curiam) (explaining 
that a COA is not needed to appeal an evidentiary ruling).  
132.   Milam v. Davis, 733 F. App’x 781, 787 (5th Cir. 2018). 
133.   E.g., United States v. Fulton, 780 F.3d 683, 687–88 (5th Cir. 2015). 
134.   Lopez-Parker v. Hale County Sheriff, No. 5:19-CV-00143-M-BQ, 2019 WL 6829048, 
at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2019).  
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judge in Louisiana recommended denying a COA as to “the rulings set forth 
in this Report and Recommendation,” which included a ruling denying an 
evidentiary hearing.135 But in early 2020, the Southern District of Texas 
properly applied Harbison in refusing to consider whether a COA should 
issue for the voluntary dismissal of a habeas petition.136 
The Sixth Circuit has not applied Harbison to an evidentiary ruling in any 
reported opinion. The court has expanded a COA “to include the issue of 
whether the district court erred in denying [petitioner’s] request to depose 
his postconviction appellate counsel,” but it did not specify the legal standard 
for its decision.137 The Sixth Circuit has previously granted a motion to 
expand a COA to include the district court’s denial of a motion to expand the 
record, but this occurred before the Harbison decision.138 Another Sixth 
Circuit case implied that a COA is required to appeal the denial of an 
evidentiary hearing.139 In yet another case, the Sixth Circuit applied the 
substantive standard of § 2253(c)(1)–(3) to determine whether a COA should 
issue as to the petitioner’s motions for sanctions and to expand the record.140  
In a current habeas proceeding in the Sixth Circuit, the court denied a 
motion to expand the COA or clarify its scope.141 The court appears to have 
implicitly held that the COA did not include the evidentiary rulings.142 The 
court also denied the motion to expand the COA and either affirmed the 
district court’s denial of a COA as to the evidentiary rulings or outright 
 
135.   United States v. Miller, No. 10-102-JWD-EWD, 2019 WL 7584763, at *1, *4 (M.D. La. 
Dec. 31, 2019). 
136.   Rosillo v. Davis, No. 7:18-MC-1090, 2020 WL 806661, at *2 & n.3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 
2020) (relying on Harbison to dismiss a prisoner’s “Motion for Bench Warrant”—which the 
prisoner later claimed was filed on his behalf by mistake—without deciding whether a COA 
should issue). 
137.   Young v. Westbrooks, 702 F. App’x 255, 256–57 (6th Cir. 2017). 
138.   Jeffries v. Morgan, 446 F. App’x 777, 780 (6th Cir. 2011). 
139.   McKinney v. Warden, London Corr. Inst., No. 17-3723, 2018 WL 3414128, at *1 (6th 
Cir. 2018). 
140.   Hillman v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., No. 16-4280, 2017 WL 5485454, at *3 (6th 
Cir. 2017). 
141.   Order Denying Motion to Expand and/or Clarify the Scope of a Certificate of 
Appealability, Broom v. Shoop, No. 19-3356, *3–4 (6th Cir. Sept. 3, 2019), ECF No. 16-2. 
142.   Id. at *4 (denying the motion to expand the COA but ignoring the alternative request 
to clarify the scope of the COA as including the evidentiary rulings). 
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affirmed the evidentiary rulings.143 A few months earlier, the Sixth Circuit 
issued a ruling that considered an evidentiary issue on appeal even though 
only the substantive claim had been certified.144 A few months later, the Sixth 
Circuit denied a COA and denied motions for an evidentiary hearing and 
appointment of counsel as moot,145 which implies that the court might have 
considered those motions if it had granted the COA. In February 2020, the 
Sixth Circuit expressly refused to order an evidentiary hearing even though 
the habeas petitioner’s COA was “limited to counsel’s failure to object” to the 
court’s decision to have certain testimony offered in closed court.146 None of 
these decisions cited either Harbison or the “final order” language of 28 
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)–(B). 
In one recent case, the Eastern District of Michigan denied an evidentiary 
hearing and several substantive claims but granted a COA without specifying 
whether it included the evidentiary hearing.147 A very recent decision from 
the Eastern District of Kentucky denied an evidentiary hearing and several 
substantive claims for relief, then ambiguously denied a COA “as to all 
issues.”148 In decisions in September and October 2019, the Sixth Circuit 
expressly denied COAs for district court evidentiary rulings.149 
The only Seventh Circuit case to cite Harbison is a district court decision 
from early 2019 examining whether Harbison’s holding applied to a denial of 
bail.150 A Seventh Circuit decision from 2005 reversed and remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing without clarifying whether the COA specified the 
evidentiary issue.151 The Eighth Circuit has cited Harbison for propositions 
 
143.   Id. at *2–4. The order is not sufficiently explicit to hazard a guess with reasonable 
certainty. 
144.   Willoughby v. White, 786 F. App’x 506, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2019), aff’g sub nom 
Willoughby v. Simpson, No. 08-179-DLB, 2014 WL 4269115 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 29, 2014). 
145.   Caraway v. Green, No. 19-5851, 2019 WL 7834329, at *1, *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 2019). 
146.   Williams v. Burt, No. 18-1461, 2020 WL 625193, at *3, *9 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2020). 
147.   Bennett v. Warren, No. 5:12-cv-12054, 2017 WL 1344775, at *13–14 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 
12, 2017). 
148.   United States v. Thomas, No. 6:16-cv-00262-GFVT-CJS, 2019 WL 6702550, at *2 
(E.D. Ky. Dec. 9, 2019). 
149.   Snowden v. Bracy, No. 19-3739, 2019 WL 7834653, at *1–2; Parkin v. Rewerts, No. 
19-1672, 2019 WL 6869683, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 16, 2019) (per curiam). 
150.   United States v. Tartareanu, No. 2:12-CR-175-PPS-APR, 2019 WL 92600, at *1 (N.D. 
Ind. Jan. 3, 2019). 
151.   Dalton v. Battaglia, 402 F.3d 729, 739 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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not related to certificates of appealability.152 It has also noted that Harbison 
applies to COAs for rulings on motions for funds to conduct a mental 
examination.153 In 2013, the Eighth Circuit granted a COA for an evidentiary 
motion.154 It recently remanded a § 2255 petition for an evidentiary hearing 
after asserting jurisdiction under § 2253 but said nothing about a COA.155  
Neither the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit nor its district courts 
have applied the Harbison holding to evidentiary rulings. Before 2009, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled on an evidentiary issue for which a COA had expressly 
and specifically been granted156 and implied it had the power to expand a 
COA to include evidentiary rulings by the district court.157 After the Harbison 
decision, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have continued to issue COAs 
that expressly include evidentiary rulings.158 At least one Ninth Circuit 
decision found that a specific evidentiary issue was “encompassed” within the 
COA despite it not having been specifically mentioned in the COA.159 In fact, 
at least two Ninth Circuit decisions reversed and remanded the respective 
district courts for an evidentiary hearing after granting a COA solely for the 
 
152.   E.g., McGehee v. Hutchinson, No. 4:17-cv-00179-KGB, 2017 WL 1399554, at *13 
(E.D. Ark. Apr. 15, 2017). 
153.   Edwards v. Roper, 688 F.3d 449, 462 (8th Cir. 2012). 
154.   Purkey v. United States, 729 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2013); see also Rhodes v. Smith, 
No. 18-3581, 2020 WL 873252, at *2 (8th Cir. Feb. 24, 2020) (noting that the district court 
granted a COA as to its denial of the petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing). 
155.   Dat v. United States, 920 F.3d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 2019). 
156.   Collier v. McDaniel, 253 F. App’x 689, 691–92 (9th Cir. 2007).  
157.   Lilly v. Lewis, 151 F. App’x 579, 582 (9th Cir. 2005); Tuggle v. Campbell, 261 F. App’x 
56, 58 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Harris v. Sharp, 941 F.3d 962, 1011–12 (10th Cir. 2019). 
158.   E.g., Love v. Scribner, No. 06cv640, 2010 WL 1031302, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2010) 
(granting a COA on the district court’s ruling on admission of an interview transcript under 
Habeas Rule 7); Graves v. Swarthout, 471 F. App’x 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The remaining 
certified issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by not holding an evidentiary 
hearing on the other two certified issues.”); Floyd v. Baker, No. 2:06–cv–0471, 2014 WL 
7240060, at *5 (D. Nev. Dec. 17, 2014) (holding that the petitioner met the standard for a COA 
for the denial of a prior motion for an evidentiary hearing). 
159.   Kemp v. Ryan, 638 F.3d 1245, 1259 n.9 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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substantive claim160 and a third decision expressly noted the possibility of 
doing so.161 
However, as late as September 2018, the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of California, citing the Supreme Court habeas decision 
Ayestas v. Davis, chose “in an abundance of caution” to grant COAs on its 
denials of various evidentiary rulings, including requests for discovery and 
evidentiary hearings.162 In December 2019, the Southern District of 
California denied a substantive claim and a request for appointment of 
counsel, and then denied a COA without noting whether the COA it denied 
would have covered the request for appointment of counsel as well.163 In 
August 2019, a federal magistrate judge of the Western District of 
Washington expressly recommended denying a COA for a request for an 
evidentiary hearing.164 Another late 2019 case expressly denied a COA “as to 
. . . the requests for factual development, record expansion, and an 
evidentiary hearing.”165 And in January 2020, after a district court denied 
substantive relief and an evidentiary hearing but granted a COA on multiple 
substantive claims,166  the Ninth Circuit—addressing only one claim—denied 
relief but reconsidered the evidentiary ruling in considerable detail.167 
A three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit recently granted a COA on 
whether a habeas petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his 
claims,168 but another panel simultaneously denied a COA on a substantive 
 
160.   Kon v. Sherman, No. 18-55401, 2020 WL 507936, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2020), opinion 
withdrawn and superseded on denial of rehear’g 787 Fed. App’x 460, 462 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(reversing and remanding for an evidentiary hearing); Cuevas Espinoza v. Spearman, 661 F. 
App’x 910, 914–15 (9th Cir. 2016) (reversing and remanding for an evidentiary hearing).  
161.   Floyd v. Filson, No. 14-99012, 2020 WL 579189, at *6 n.3 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2020). 
162.   Jurado v. Davis, No. 08cv1400, 2018 WL 4405418, at *159 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2018) 
(citing Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S. Ct. 1080, 1088 n.1 (2018)). 
163.   Maraglino, v. Espinoza, No. 19cv0109 LAB (KSC), 2019 WL 6829262, at *1, *30–32 
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2019). 
164.   Zellmer v. Holbrook, No. C17-1776 RSM-BAT, 2019 WL 6879316, at *4 (W.D. Wash. 
Aug. 7, 2019); see also Duffey v. Uttecht, No. 3:19-CV-5694-RBL-DWC, 2019 WL 6829052, at 
*2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2019). 
165.   Catlin v. Davis, No. 1:07-cv-01466-LJO-SAB, 2019 WL 6885017, at *278 (E.D. Cal. 
Dec. 17, 2019). 
166.   Cook v. Kernan, 948 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’g in part No. C 15-06343 WHA, 
2017 WL 4516837 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2017).  
167.   Cook, 948 F.3d at 970. 
168.   Harmon v. Sharp, 936 F.3d 1044, 1055 (10th Cir. 2019). 
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claim and affirmed the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing on 
that claim.169 A few days after declining to issue a COA in one breath and 
affirming the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing in the next,170 
the Tenth Circuit dealt with a request for a COA on, inter alia, the district 
court’s denial of a motion to object, compel, and sanction. Citing Harbison 
equivocally, the court held the following as alternative bases for denying 
relief: the district court did not abuse its discretion, the standard for a COA 
was not met, and “even if a COA were not required, . . . [there was] no 
error.”171 Another Tenth Circuit decision expressly discussed its decision to 
deny a COA on the petitioner’s claim that the district court erred by refusing 
to grant an evidentiary hearing.172 Another recent decision reversed and 
remanded a petition to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.173 Two 
decisions at the end of 2019 denied a COA on all claims and additionally 
denied “petitioner’s requests to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to 
appoint counsel.”174 The Tenth Circuit has also expressly denied a COA as to 
an evidentiary hearing.175  
The Tenth Circuit has thus, in one year, held that a COA must specifically 
and expressly include evidentiary rulings, then seemingly decided that it need 
not, then, after discovering the guiding star of Harbison, got into a muddle 
and could not make up its mind. But in early 2020, the Tenth Circuit 
expressly recognized Harbison’s key decision by relying on Harbison to hold 
that “[a]n order denying recusal is a collateral order that does not require a 
COA for appeal,”176 nor does an “order denying [a] motion to disqualify on 
the merits” nor an order denying reconsideration of a denial of a Rule 59(e) 
 
169.   Tafoya v. Martinez, 787 F. App’x 501, 502, 505 (10th Cir. 2019). 
170.   Rippey v. Utah, 783 F. App’x 823, 824–28 (10th Cir. 2019). In June 2019, another panel 
of the Tenth Circuit denied a COA and at the same time affirmed the district court’s denial of 
an evidentiary hearing. Glasser v. McCall, 780 F. App’x, 564, 566 (10th Cir. 2019). 
171.   Phipps v. Raemisch, No. 18-1396, 2019 WL 5801698, at *1, *3, *6 n.9, *10–11 (10th 
Cir. Nov. 7, 2019) (citing Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009)). 
172.   Gay v. Foster, 791 F. App’x 748, 752–53 (10th Cir. 2019) (denying a COA on the 
petitioner’s second question—whether the petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to 
develop the factual basis for one of his substantive claims—and applying the reasonable jurist 
standard). 
173.   Harris v. Sharp, 941 F.3d 962, 1012 (10th Cir. 2019). 
174.   May v. Heimgartner, No. 19-3206, 2019 WL 6358286, at *5 (10th Cir. Nov. 27, 2019); 
Collum v. Benzon, 788 F. App’x 586, 589 (10th Cir. 2019). 
175.   Borden v. Bryant, 786 F. App’x 843, 846–47 (10th Cir. 2019). 
176.   Vreeland v. Zupan, No. 19-1244, 2020 WL 402271, at *3 (10th Cir. Jan. 24, 2020). 
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motion.177 It remains to be seen when the Tenth Circuit will recognize 
Harbison’s specific relevance to evidentiary rulings on appeal. 
The Eleventh Circuit recently denied habeas relief on appeal after 
considering two issues that had been certified by the district court, one of 
which was “whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Davis’s 
request to employ [a] stay and abeyance procedure.”178 The district court had 
granted the petitioner’s motion to expand the COA to specifically include the 
stay and abeyance.179 Another district court in the Eleventh Circuit, after 
having “determined that the [moving party] is not entitled to relief on the 
merits,” ambiguously denied a COA as to all other “issues presented” in the 
petition, potentially including the petitioner’s request for an evidentiary 
hearing.180 But in another Eleventh Circuit case, the magistrate 
recommended denying relief and a COA,181 the district court affirmed in part 
and denied an evidentiary hearing but granted a COA on a substantive 
claim,182 and a panel of the Eleventh Circuit expressly reviewed the district 
court’s ruling denying an evidentiary hearing.183 Interestingly, the Southern 
District of Florida routinely cites Harbison for the comparatively mundane 
proposition that habeas petitioners must obtain a COA to appeal.184 
The Federal Circuit and the District of Columbia have cited Harbison for 
propositions related to statutory interpretation.185 In the recently issued 
opinion in the case In re N.H.M., the D.C. Circuit applied Harbison to “orders 
 
177.   United States v. Rice, No. 19-6149, 2020 WL 729533, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 13, 2020). 
178.   Davis v. Sellers, 940 F.3d 1175, 1179 (11th Cir. 2019). 
179.   Id. at 1185. 
180.   Diaz v. United States, No. 16-CIV-24126-ALTONAGA, 2018 WL 10150923, at *7 
(S.D. Fla, Jan. 2, 2018). 
181.   Gaines v. Florida Comm’n on Offender Review, No. 4:14-cv-588-RH-GRJ, 2018 WL 
3242698, at *9–10 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2018). 
182.   Id. at *2. 
183.   Gaines v. Attorney Gen., 788 F. App’x 623, 627–29 (11th Cir. 2019). 
184.   See, e.g., Mack v. United States, No. 17-23791-CV-SCOLA, 2019 WL 7834002, at *9 
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 2019); Demosthene v. United States, No. 18-22314-CIV-ALTONAGA, 
2018 WL 10398361, at *18 (S.D. Fla. July 2, 2018). Numerous habeas opinions from the 
Southern District of Florida have a COA section (generally a paragraph) near the very end of 
the opinion that appears to be basically copied and pasted from opinion to opinion. 
185.   Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 754 F.3d 923, 935 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(Reyna, J., dissenting); Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Abraxis 
Bioscience, LLC v. Kappos, 10 F. Supp. 3d 53, 87–88, 88 n.27 (D.D.C. 2014). 
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defining the scope of paid representation.”186 The court applied the collateral 
order doctrine and decided to review an order denying compensation to an 
indigent petitioner’s attorney.187 The D.C. Circuit recognized that COAs are 
not required for nonfinal orders188 but apparently has not applied Harbison 
to evidentiary rulings. 
Of the circuits that have applied Harbison outside of the context of federal 
funds for indigent petitioners, only one has applied its holding to evidentiary 
rulings. Even that court—the Fifth Circuit—hasissued contradictory rulings 
on the applicability of the COA requirement to evidentiary rulings. The 
Ninth Circuit seems aware that its COA jurisprudence may not be in line 
with Supreme Court precedent, but has not resolved its confusion. In 
summary, nearly every federal circuit court of appeals and its district courts 
are confused on this question or have yet to realize that a petitioner may 
appeal an evidentiary ruling if the related substantive claim has been certified 
for appeal. 
2. Legal Scholarship 
Some scholarly articles have cited Harbison for propositions relating to 
indigent defense.189 More have cited it in discussions of statutory 
interpretation.190 Few have cited it for its holding on COAs, and most of those 
scholars have cited it only for the narrow proposition that no COA is 
 
186.   See In re N.H.M., Nos. 16-FS-1289 & 16-FS-1290, 2020 WL 579001, at *3 (D.C. Feb. 
6, 2020) (citing Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 182–83 (2009); Clark v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 459 
(5th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Harbison, 556 U.S. 180). 
187.   Id. at *2–3. 
188.   Id. at *3. 
189.   E.g., Angela A. Allen-Bell, A Prescription for Healing a National Wound: Two Doses of 
Executive Direct Action Equals a Portion of Justice and a Serving of Redress for America & the 
Black Panther Party, 5 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 1, 62–63, 63 n.285 (2015); Lee 
Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61, 89 n.139 (2011); Leah M. Litman, 
Officiating Removal, 164 U. PA. L. REV. Online 33, 40 n.48 (2015). 
190.   E.g., June M. Besek & Owen W. Keiter, Capitol Records v. Vimeo: The Peculiar Case 
of Pre-1972 Sound Recordings and Federal Copyright Law, 41 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 559, 582 
n.140 (2018); James J. Brudney, Confirmatory Legislative History, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 901, 902 
n.4 (2011); James N. Duca, Now Where Did that Mortgage Note Go? A Two-Act Play Under 
U.C.C. § 3-301 and 11 U.S.C. § 1141(C), 16 Haw. B. J. 71, 80 n.42 (2013); A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 
464–65 n.130 (2013); R. George Wright, Constitutional Cases and the Four Cardinal Virtues, 
60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 195, 207 n.79 (2012). 
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required to appeal the denial of counsel appointed under 28 U.S.C. § 3599.191 
They recognize that Harbison is not primarily about federal habeas COAs—
it is about federal funding for indigent defense: “[i]n an unusual twist, both 
parties and all the amici agree[d] that a certificate of appealability was not 
necessary in this case.”192 The Court dispensed with the COA question in a 
very brief section at the beginning of the opinion. That is why so many courts 
and scholars have failed to realize the significant of Harbison to COAs on 
evidentiary rulings. Other scholarly works that cited Harbison discussed 
COAs and appellate jurisdiction,193 nonfinal orders other than evidentiary 
rulings,194 or other concepts unrelated to COAs for evidentiary rulings.195 
Of the two scholarly articles that have cited Harbison and delved deeply 
into the intricacies of COAs, both omitted any mention of discovery and 
motions to expand the record, and both mentioned evidentiary hearings only 
in passing in a footnote.196 A student article on Harbison written before it was 
decided focused exclusively on the appointment of counsel issues and 
expressly disclaimed any intent to discuss the COA requirement.197 An 
annually issued piece on habeas corpus law in 2018 cited Harbison but did 
not apply its holding to evidentiary matters.198 West’s Federal Forms includes 
a “Petition for Certificate of Appealability—Extended Version” that requests 
a COA on two issues—the second of which is the district court’s denial of 
 
191.   See Carol Garfiel Freeman, Supreme Court Cases of Interest, 24 CRIM. JUST. 48, 51 
(2009); Kovarsky, supra note 189, at 89 n.139; John F. Blevins et al., United States Supreme 
Court Update, 21 APP. ADVOC. 278, 289 (2009); Litman, supra note 189, at 40 n.48. 
192.   Kathy Swedlow, Can a Federally Appointed Lawyer Represent a Capital Defendant in 
State Clemency Proceedings?, 36 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 242, 243 (2009). This article’s 
entire discussion of the COA issues consists of a brief paragraph. Id. 
193.   See, e.g., Hagglund, supra note 106. 
194.   David Goodwin, An Appealing Choice: An Analysis of and a Proposal for Certificates 
of Appealability in “Procedural” Habeas Appeals, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 791, 819 n.118, 
832 n.182 (2013).  
195.   Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts: An Essay in 
Honor of Henry Monaghan, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 620–21 n.166 (2010). 
196.   Jonah J. Horwitz, Certifiable: Certificates of Appealability, Habeas Corpus, and the 
Perils of Self-Judging, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 695, 704 n.39 (2012); Margaret A. Upshaw, 
Comment, The Unappealing State of Certificates of Appealability, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1609, 1612 
n.25 (2015). 
197.   See Sarah Rutledge, Note, Harbison v. Bell, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 
215, 215 n.1 (2009). 
198.   Habeas Relief for State Prisoners, 47 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 1045, 1088 
n.2868, 1100–01, 1101 n.2916 (2018). 
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discovery.199 The Corpus Juris Secundum section on COAs does not discuss 
this issue at all.200 
Under Harbison, no COA is required to appeal an order other than a 
nonfinal order to evidentiary rulings. No scholarly work has discussed 
Harbison’s impact on COAs for evidentiary rulings. Very few cases have 
addressed the question of Harbison’s impact on COAs outside the context of 
motions for federally appointed counsel. As indicated above, the Ninth 
Circuit is confused as to whether COAs must specifically include evidentiary 
rulings. The First Circuit Court of Appeals has not cited Harbison, and the 
Second and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal have not applied Harbison to 
COAs for evidentiary rulings. The Sixth Circuit has issued contradictory 
rulings. The courts of appeal that have not already done so should directly 
apply Harbison to hold that a COA is not required to appeal an evidentiary 
ruling that is directly related to a substantive claim certified for appeal. 
III. THE COA REQUIREMENT 
If a petitioner’s substantive claim has been certified for appeal, he may 
appeal related evidentiary rulings even if the COA does not specifically 
include it. The text of § 2253(c)(1)–(3) demands this interpretation. The 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Harbison made explicit what some circuits 
recognized independently, but none of the courts of appeal have consistently 
or perfectly applied Harbison’s holding to evidentiary issues. Sometimes, the 
court cannot properly reach the substantive claim without resolving related 
evidentiary issues. If the courts recognize that no COA is required for 
evidentiary issues, petitioners will be able to raise additional issues before the 
appellate courts and therefore have a greater chance of obtaining relief. In 
light of the barriers and obstacles to relief AEDPA has imposed, this 
interpretation will serve an important moderating influence. 
A. Text of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)–(3) 
The best interpretation of AEDPA’s COA provision is that it does not 
require that evidentiary rulings be specifically certified to be appealed. 
Despite the provision’s requirement that a COA “indicate which specific 
 
199.   1C WEST’S FED. FORMS, COURT OF APPEALS § 6:5 (6th ed.).  
200.   39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 487 (Feb. 2020); see also id. at § 509 (discussing the power 
of federal courts of appeal to remand to the district courts for evidentiary hearings but relying 
mostly on cases that pre-date AEDPA). 
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issue or issues” is certified for appeal,201 the language of the statute supports 
this interpretation. Only “final order[s]” need to be certified for appeal,202 and 
to obtain a COA the petitioner must make a “substantial showing [that he 
has been denied] a constitutional right.”203 Neither of these requirements 
makes sense when applied to evidentiary rulings and other nonfinal orders. 
The relevant part of the statute reads as follows: 
(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 
appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of 
appeals from— 
(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in 
which the detention complained of arises out of 
process issued by a State court; or 
(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 
2255. 
(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph 
(1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of 
the denial of a constitutional right. 
(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall 
indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing 
required by paragraph (2).204 
1. “Final Order” 
Citing § 2253(c)(1)(A), the Supreme Court in Harbison held that since a 
motion to appoint counsel or to enlarge the authority of counsel is not a “final 
order,” the petitioner did not need a COA to appeal it.205 The Harbison 
Court’s interpretation was based on a straightforward application of the 
“final order” language of the statute to the order being appealed. A final order 
“ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but 
execute the judgment.”206 In habeas proceedings, a final order is an order 
 
201.   28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3) (2012). 
202.   28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)–(B) (2012) (emphasis added). 
203.   28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). 
204.   28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)–(3) (2012). 
205.   Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009). 
206.   Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs and 
Participating Emp’r, 571 U.S. 177, 183 (2014). 
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disposing of a petition on the merits.207 Other orders and rulings do not 
require a COA, including orders appointing or denying appointment of 
counsel208 and orders denying motions for a bizarre writ “to order state 
officials not to interfere with the gathering of information in support of 
clemency.”209 
Evidentiary rulings are typically not final orders. An evidentiary ruling is 
a final order only if the district court intended that the matter be practically 
closed or if the district court had nothing left to do to resolve the case,210 but 
this circumstance probably is not even possible and has likely never occurred. 
However, the collateral order doctrine applies in habeas cases.211 The 
collateral order doctrine allows certain orders that do not dispose of a claim 
on the merits to be appealed by construing “final order” to include orders 
that do not dispose of a case but “conclusively resolv[e]” claims collateral to 
the “rights asserted in the action.”212 For example, a district court’s order 
denying a motion to reconsider its protective order restricting the use of 
certain evidence in a habeas proceeding is a collateral order.213  
Although an evidentiary ruling can be issued in a final or collateral order 
and thus be subject to the COA requirement, most evidentiary orders are 
neither final nor collateral. Like motions to appoint or enlarge the authority 
of counsel, they do not dispose of the case on the merits and they do not 
resolve claims collateral to the rights asserted in the petitioner’s substantive 
claims. The Harbison Court applied a straightforward interpretation of the 
provision. The matter was so clear that both parties and the United States as 
amicus conceded that no COA was required.214 This straightforward 
interpretation requires the same result for nonfinal and non-collateral 
evidentiary rulings. 
2. “Denial of Constitutional Right” 
The statute says that “[t]he certificate of appealability . . . shall indicate 
[the] specific issue or issues” on which “the applicant has made a substantial 
 
207.   Swanson v. DeSantis, 606 F.3d 829, 832 (6th Cir. 2010). 
208.   Harbison, 556 U.S. at 183. 
209.   Baze v. Parker, 632 F.3d 338, 340–41 (6th Cir. 2011). 
210.   See Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Servs., Inc., 541 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2008). 
211.   See, e.g., Ghent v. Wong, 371 F. App’x 782 (9th Cir. 2010). 
212.   Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (citation omitted). 
213.   Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036, 1037–38 (9th Cir. 2002). 
214.   Rutledge, supra note 197, at 215 n.4. 
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showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”215 This language is 
inconsistent with the typical standard of review for evidentiary rulings, which 
is abuse of discretion.216 Nearly every circuit applies the abuse of discretion 
standard to habeas evidentiary rulings but reviews the district court’s 
substantive analysis de novo.217 A district court’s denial of a COA is also 
reviewed de novo.218 By applying these distinct standards of review, the 
circuits therefore recognize that evidentiary rulings are separate and distinct 
from the underlying substantive claims on which a COA must be obtained.219 
Additionally, it would be odd to deny appellate review of an evidentiary 
ruling based on the petitioner’s failure to make a substantial showing that the 
district court, by denying his evidentiary motion, violated one of his 
constitutional rights. Denying an evidentiary motion might conceivably 
violate a petitioner’s constitutional rights in rare circumstances, but generally 
does not. A few cases have applied a paraphrase of this standard: whether 
reasonable jurists would agree with the district court’s decision.220 Although 
this judicially crafted test sounds apropos when applied to determining 
whether a COA should issue as to an evidentiary ruling, the language of the 
statute governs. Just because a reasonable jurist might disagree with the 
 
215.   28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)–(3) (2012). 
216.   Even though the district court “must” grant an evidentiary hearing to federal prisoners 
petitioning under § 2255 unless the record conclusively shows that the prisoner is not entitled 
to relief, the court’s decision to hold or refuse such a hearing is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. E.g., Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 2008). District court rulings that dispose of a claim 
on the merits for procedural rather than substantive reasons are reviewed under a 
modification of the reasonable jurist standard. Under this modified standard, a COA will issue 
if a reasonable jurist would debate both the procedural ruling and the merits of the substantive 
claim. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 
217.   E.g., Dat v. United States, 920 F.3d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir. 2019); Cornwell v. Bradshaw, 
559 F.3d 398, 405, 410 (6th Cir. 2009). Another example: “We review the district court’s denial 
of an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion,” but denial of the substantive claims is 
reviewed de novo. Black v. Carpenter, 866 F.3d 734, 742, 743 (6th Cir. 2017). Et cetera, ad 
infinitum. Or, as the Bluebook would have it, see, e.g., Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 622, 625 
(6th Cir. 2011). 
218.   See Slack, 529 U.S. at 483–84. 
219.   The Eleventh Circuit recently considered a habeas petition for which the district court 
had committed the very rare error of applying the reasonable jurist standard to a nonfinal 
order. Davis v. Sellers, 940 F.3d 1175, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that the district court 
granted a motion to expand a COA to include a motion for a stay and abeyance). 
220.   See Collier v. McDaniel, 253 F. App’x 689, 691–92 (9th Cir. 2007).  
342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd   82 5/14/20   9:43 AM
2020]                                  EVIDENTIARY ISSUES                              523 
   
 
district court’s evidentiary ruling does not mean that the district court 
probably violated the petitioner’s constitutional right and therefore satisfied 
the standard in § 2253(c). For instance, denying a procedural motion does 
not necessarily result in a deprivation of constitutional rights. The same is 
true of another judicial paraphrase of the standard: whether the “the issues 
presented [are] adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”221 
This judicially crafted paraphrase is helpful in applying the substantive 
standard, but, without reference to the text of § 2253(c)(1)–(3), it can mislead 
courts—or clerks fresh from law school upon whom judges rely extensively 
for legal research and drafting opinions—to believe that evidentiary or other 
issues might need separate consideration for a COA. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that the reasonable jurist standard applies 
to procedural rulings if the district court dismissed the petition solely on 
procedural grounds.222 At first glance, this standard would seem as 
inappropriate to procedural issues as to evidentiary issues. It might be 
inferred that since this standard can apply to procedural issues, it can also 
reasonably apply to evidentiary issues. However, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that the “substantial showing” language of § 2253(c)(2)—for which 
the reasonable jurist test is a paraphrase and supplement—was designed by 
Congress to codify the judicially created standard for granting a certificate of 
probable cause under the habeas scheme that existed before AEDPA was 
enacted.223 Under the prior standard, evidentiary rulings were reviewed for 
abuse of discretion and procedural rulings that prevented the district court 
from reaching the merits of a habeas claim received a COA based upon the 
“substantial showing” standard and its supplementary paraphrase, the 
reasonable jurist test.224 Also, the district court may issue a final order based 
solely on a procedural ruling alone but never on an evidentiary ruling alone. 
It is therefore appropriate that procedural rulings can be subject to the COA 
requirement, but evidentiary rulings are not. 
 
 
 
 
221.   Slack, 529 U.S. at 484 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
222.   Id. 
223.   Id. 
224.   Id. at 484–85. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893–94. 
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3. Other Cases Interpreting and Applying § 2253(c) 
Although only the Fifth Circuit has applied Harbison to evidentiary 
rulings—and even that court subsequently contradicted itself225—most 
circuits have applied Harbison or its underlying interpretation of § 2253(c) 
to nonfinal orders of some sort. According to the Fourth Circuit, a district 
court’s decision on a motion to proceed in forma pauperis need not be 
certified for appeal.226 Neither does a district court order dismissing a petition 
or motion as an unauthorized second or successive petition.227 The Fourth 
Circuit ruled similarly on a variety of other orders.228 The Fifth Circuit held 
that no COA was required to appeal an order transferring a second or 
successive habeas petition to the court of appeals for authorization.229 The 
Sixth Circuit held that no COA is required to appeal the denial of a motion 
for a bizarre writ “to order state officials not to interfere with the gathering 
of information in support of clemency.”230 Three Ninth Circuit cases cited 
Harbison and applied its holding to nonfinal district court orders, including 
modified protective orders and the denial of a true Rule 60(b) motion for 
relief from a judgment.231 Most district court decisions that deny evidentiary 
motions and grant or deny a COA never mention whether the evidentiary 
rulings are or need to be separately evaluated for a COA.232 
Among the circuits, there is considerable confusion but no substantive 
debate. Most of the circuits recognize that nonfinal orders do not need a COA 
to be appealed, but few have applied that understanding to evidentiary 
rulings directly related to substantive claims that have been certified for 
appeal. The principles that led the circuits to hold as they did in the cases 
 
225.   See Milam v. Davis, 733 F. App’x 781, 787 (5th Cir. 2018); Washington v. Davis, 715 
F. App’x 380, 383 (5th Cir. 2017). 
226.   E.g., Jackson v. Lewis, 771 F. App’x 316, 316 (4th Cir. 2019). 
227.   E.g., United States v. Barnes, 752 F. App’x 161, 161 (4th Cir. 2019). 
228.   See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
229.   United States v. Fulton, 780 F.3d 683, 684–85, 687–88 (5th Cir. 2015). 
230.   Baze v. Parker, 632 F.3d 338, 340–41 (6th Cir. 2011). 
231.   United States v. Winkles, 795 F.3d 1134, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2015); Lambright v. Ryan, 
698 F.3d 808, 817 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that a district court’s order on a modified 
protective order was appealable without a COA); Ghent v. Wong, 371 F. App’x 782, 784 n.1 
(9th Cir. 2010) (applying the collateral order doctrine to a modified protective order). 
232.   See, e.g., United States v. Diggs, No. 1:15-CR-166, 2019 WL 5445663, at *1, *9 (W.D. 
Mich. Oct. 24, 2019); Hotton v. United States, Nos. 12-CR-0649(JS) & 17-CV-4440(JS), 2019 
WL 5310673, at *1, *12, *15–16 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2019). 
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cited above should lead them to rule similarly in future habeas cases involving 
appellate review of evidentiary rulings. 
4. COAs Should Not Be Unduly Limited 
Because COAs should not be limited unnecessarily, federal courts of 
appeal should allow petitioners to challenge related evidentiary issues even if 
the COA does not specifically and expressly include them. Interpreting § 
2253(c) as requiring a COA to appeal a final order but not as requiring the 
COA to specify related evidentiary issues is consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s concern that lower courts are unduly restricting habeas petitions 
through the COA requirement. AEDPA was enacted to circumscribe the 
ability of petitioners to waste judicial resources by using federal habeas 
corpus law to present repeated and non-meritorious claims for 
postconviction relief. The AEDPA standards were “meant to be” difficult to 
satisfy.233 AEDPA contained necessary reforms, but its restrictions justly give 
rise to concerns for the rights of prisoners. AEDPA’s strict requirements and 
procedural bars make it harder for prisoners to bring petitions and make it 
easier for judges to deny them.234  
Because denying petitions is routine and because issuing a COA inherently 
questions the district court’s judgment—and because most habeas petitions 
should not succeed on the merits—most federal magistrate and district court 
judges are loath to recommend or to grant a COA. Denying habeas relief in 
close and questionable cases threatens the treasured right of individual liberty 
and the panoply of individual constitutional rights against improper criminal 
prosecution, conviction, and punishment. Because AEDPA effectively bars 
frivolous habeas petitions and promotes swift termination of non-
meritorious claims, it may also make it unduly difficult for petitioners to 
succeed on meritorious claims. Therefore, district courts and courts of appeal 
should be more receptive to requests for COAs.  
In 2003, the Supreme Court explained that a court “should not [deny] . . . a 
COA merely because it believes the applicant will not . . . ” prevail on 
appeal.235 Worried that the lower courts were misinterpreting its holding in 
Slack v. McDaniel in 2000 and unduly restricting COAs, the Court noted that 
 
233.   Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). 
234.   See generally supra, Sections II.A–D. 
235.   Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003). 
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a COA could only be granted where the district court denied the relief and 
success on appeal was therefore unlikely.236 The Court went on: 
We do not require petitioner to prove, before the issuance of 
a COA, that some jurists would grant the petition for habeas 
corpus. Indeed, a claim can be debatable even though every 
jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been granted 
and the case has received full consideration, that petitioner 
will not prevail.237 
The Court also warned the lower courts not to deny petitions and then 
unconsciously allow their opinion on whether the claim should prevail to 
color their judgment on whether a COA should issue, which is judged by a 
different standard.238 Because the lower courts may have unduly limited 
habeas petitions through the COA requirement, federal courts of appeal 
should allow petitioners to challenge related evidentiary issues even if the 
COA does not specifically and expressly include them. 
B. Evidentiary Issues as Included in Substantive Issues 
An alternative basis for concluding that § 2253(c) does not require a COA 
to expressly and specifically include evidentiary rulings is that at least some 
evidentiary issues are included in substantive issues. Although the statute 
says that the COA “shall indicate which specific issue or issues” are 
included,239 some of the courts of appeal have held that some issues and 
arguments are included in other issues. Therefore, a COA need not specify 
such issues and arguments as certified for appeal. These issues and arguments 
could relate to evidentiary rulings. 
In Steele v. Randle, the Sixth Circuit held that arguments that address a 
claim that has been certified for appeal need not be specified in the COA.240 
Steele filed a petition after the one-year statute of limitations ran, but the 
respondent failed to raise the issue in its return.241 The district court sua 
sponte dismissed the petition on the basis of the statute of limitations but 
 
236.   Id. (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). 
237.   Id. at 338. 
238.   Id. at 336–37. 
239.   28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). 
240.   Steele v. Randle, 37 F. App’x 162, 164–65 (6th Cir. 2002). 
241.   Id. at 164. 
342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd   86 5/14/20   9:43 AM
2020]                                  EVIDENTIARY ISSUES                              527 
   
 
issued a COA as to whether the petition was time-barred.242 On appeal, the 
respondent claimed that Steele could argue that the petition was not time-
barred, but could not argue that the district court did not have the authority 
on its own initiative to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.243 The Sixth 
Circuit reasoned that the district court’s “authority to sua sponte dismiss a 
petition as time-barred is inherently intertwined with its decision that the 
petition did not meet the one-year statute of limitations.”244 In Phillips v. 
White, the Sixth Circuit similarly held that where the district court issues a 
COA as to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the closely related issue 
of whether to apply a presumption that the petitioner was prejudiced by the 
ineffective assistance of counsel245 is part and parcel of that claim and 
therefore included in the COA.246 
The First Circuit has held that a COA as to the timeliness of a petition 
necessarily included the issue of whether “discovery of [an] alleged 
error . . . is a ‘factual predicate’ for the purposes of the AEDPA statute of 
limitations . . . .”247 The disputed issue of law had to be resolved before the 
court could resolve the claim being appealed. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has 
held that if a procedural question must be resolved before the court can 
consider the merits of a constitutional claim certified for appeal, and if the 
district court was silent on the procedural question, the court of appeals “will 
assume that the COA also encompasses any procedural claims that must be 
addressed on appeal.”248 In a footnote, another Ninth Circuit case declared 
that in that case it interpreted a COA to include the denial of a related 
evidentiary motion but gave no explanation and cited no authority.249 If a 
related issue—including an evidentiary issue—necessarily must be resolved 
before the certified issue can be resolved (such as a threshold procedural 
 
242.   Id. 
243.   Id. 164–65. 
244.   Id. 
245.   See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 649, 666–67 (1984). 
246.   Phillips v. White, 851 F.3d 567, 580–81 (6th Cir. 2017). Petitioners claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel must prove that the alleged ineffective assistance prejudiced their 
defense. See id. at 580–81. 
247.   Holmes v. Spencer, 685 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2012) 
248.   Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000). 
249.   Kemp v. Ryan, 638 F.3d 1245, 1259 n.9 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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issue), or if resolving the related issue is a necessary part of resolving the 
certified issue, then the COA includes the related issue.250 
C. Practical Benefits to Habeas Petitioners 
If the courts apply Harbison’s interpretation of § 2253(c) to evidentiary 
rulings, some habeas petitioners will benefit considerably, while others will 
remain unaffected. Because the courts of appeal can sua sponte expand a 
COA to include related issues, adopting a different interpretation of § 2254(c) 
would still leave the courts of appeal the discretion to address evidentiary 
issues not certified for appeal but which petitioners raise and brief. But under 
the interpretation advocated in this article, the federal appellate courts could 
be forced to address evidentiary issues they might otherwise ignore or 
summarily deny. The government is not required to obtain a COA to appeal 
a district court’s grant of habeas relief, but if the government appeals, the 
petitioner may employ arguments rejected below to defend the favorable 
judgment, and need not first obtain a COA.251 Therefore, this interpretation 
does not affect petitioners who successfully petition for the writ but whose 
favorable judgment is appealed by a state or the federal government. 
1. Ability to Expand COAs is Unaffected 
The court of appeals may expand a COA.252 The court may do so sua 
sponte or on a motion by the petitioner.253 A notice of appeal may be treated 
as a motion to grant or expand a COA if it includes issues not already 
certified.254 The interpretation of § 2253(c) adopted in Harbison and 
advocated here does not affect the ability of the circuit courts to expand or 
grant COAs. The courts of appeal may continue to issue and expand COAs 
on motion by the petitioner and to expand COAs sua sponte. On this point, 
the current procedures would remain unaffected. 
 
 
250.   See Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 408 n.68 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 877 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004); Wright v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corr., 278 F.3d 
1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2002). 
251.   Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 271, 282–83 (2015). 
252.   See Young v. Westbrooks, 702 F. App’x 255, 256–57 (6th Cir. 2017); Collier v. 
McDaniel, 253 F. App’x 689, 691–92 (9th Cir. 2007). 
253.   See Young, 702 F. App’x at 256–57 (6th Cir. 2017). 
254.   Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000) (citing FED. R. APP. P. 22(b); FED. R. CIV. 
P. 8(f); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 240 (1998)). 
342350-Liberty_LR_14-3_Text.indd   88 5/14/20   9:43 AM
2020]                                  EVIDENTIARY ISSUES                              529 
   
 
2. Right to Raise Issues on Appeal 
Habeas petitioners would benefit from the interpretation of § 2253(c) 
adopted in Harbison and advocated here because they would gain the right 
to force the court of appeals to directly and fully address evidentiary issues 
related to the substantive claims raised on appeal. Because a COA need not 
specifically include evidentiary or other nonfinal and non-collateral orders, 
the petitioner could obtain appellate review of those orders as a matter of 
right anytime they obtained appellate review of directly related substantive 
claims. The upshot is that habeas petitioners whose claims are sufficiently 
meritorious to warrant appellate review would have more issues to appeal 
and therefore another chance to convince the court to hear favorable 
evidence, which in turn increases their chances of obtaining relief on a 
substantive claim. Evidentiary hearings are frequently sought but rarely 
granted.255 Under this interpretation of § 2253(c), they could be more 
frequently obtained. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Deliberately throwing the innocent in jail is no longer fashionable, and our 
legal system emphasizes the horror of punishing the innocent over the 
problem of letting the guilty go free. Unfortunately, the system is abused and 
mistakes happen. Innocent people go to jail, and some of the guilty are 
imprisoned in violation of their constitutional rights and our nation’s 
common values. The Great Writ, limited as it is under AEDPA, is still a 
powerful weapon to wield against improper convictions and illegal 
sentences—against unjust punishment. If the courts of appeal recognize that 
the language of § 2253(c)(1)–(3) gives petitioners the right to appellate review 
of evidentiary issues directly related to substantive habeas claims certified for 
appeal, the truth can be ascertained with greater certainty and more of the 
innocent will go free. Lady Justice would be proud. 
 
255.   See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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